University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
NotiSur

Latin America Digital Beat (LADB)

3-24-1987

Origins of the Brazilian Foreign Debt Burden (Part
3)
Guest Author

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur
Recommended Citation
Guest Author. "Origins of the Brazilian Foreign Debt Burden (Part 3)." (1987). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur/557

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NotiSur by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu.

LADB Article Id: 76895
ISSN: 1060-4189

Origins of the Brazilian Foreign Debt Burden (Part 3)
by Guest
Category/Department: Brazil
Published: 1987-03-24
In this three-part series, Brazilian journalist Paulo R. Schilling describes the historical development
of his country's huge foreign debt burden, major beneficiaries and losers in the process of
accumulating the largest foreign debt in the world, and the pros and cons of certain "solutions" to
the debt crisis.
The third part is a discussion of the inevitability of the Sarney administration's decision to
temporarily suspend interest payments on its debts with foreign commercial banks. Schilling argues
that all actors involved are aware that Brasilia had no choice in the matter, barring economic and
financial disaster. In the same vein, despite "hard-line" rhetoric to the contrary, creditors will seek
accommodation to Brazilian demands.
By Paulo Schilling
As long predicted by the liberal wing of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), leftist
political parties, and the major labor unions, Brasilia has thrown in the towel in the race to keep up
with its nearly $1 billion monthly interest payments to the foreign banks. For the past three years,
the interest bill was equivalent to five percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). In late 1986, it
became apparent that the government's juggling act to simultaneously maintain political legitimacy
via price controls (thereby increasing domestic consumption), and a fat trade surplus for interest
payments had run its course.
Between October 1986 and January 1987, the Brazilian trade surplus plunged from about $1 billion
to $150 million per month. In an article published in the FOLHA DE SAO PAULO (02/22/87), Celso
Lafer, celebrated economist, and professor at the Universidade de Sao Paulo, summarized the
present situation as follows: "What this proves is that surplus generation dedicated to foreign debt
payment...is not viable in the medium or long term. Underdeveloped countries see themselves
transformed into capital exporters...This capital transfer makes growth literally impossible, and
without growth domestic needs go unmet.
Political legitimacy can be achieved only through economic growth, a commitment [by the
government] to prevent recession... "An ongoing trade surplus generates tensions comparable
to those arising from continuous deficits, as well as provoking the adoption of protectionist
measures in developed countries. It is a perverse vicious circle..." President Jose Sarney's Feb. 20
announcement to postpone interest payments to the foreign banks is not a "radical" move, since
there are no real expectations of an indefinite moratorium. \
Brazilian officials have used conciliatory language, indicating they do not not wish "confrontation
with creditor banks," but only improved terms on the outstanding debt. In fact, however, an
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undeclared moratorium has been in force for the past two years. From early 1985 to January 1987,
when the last rescheduling agreement with the Paris Club was concluded, Brazil did not pay a single
dollar to western creditor governments.
The accumulated debt of $4.1 billion was instead "stretched out" for six more years. Brasilia is
requesting $5 billion in new loans from the banks, a large portion of which would be dedicated to
settling financial obligations coming due in the first quarter of the year when the trade surplus has
shrunk to a fraction of the monthly average for 1986. According to existing agreements, Brazil is
scheduled to pay $4.8 billion in interest in the first half of the year, and another $1 billion to the IMF.
In addition, expected capital outflows under the rubrics of profits to foreign-based transnationals,
and payments for technology and royalties, total nearly $1.5 billion for the same period.
Most financial analysts predicted that the banks will be "reasonable" in negotiations with Brazil
to resolve existing problems, mainly because even the threat of a long-term moratorium by the
world's largest debtor nation would send shock waves throughout the international finance system.
Moreover, the bankers fear even greater instability if other major debtors, such as Argentina and
Mexico, follow the Brazilian example (present or future). Contrary to all expectations, however, the
banks are apparently resisting Brazilian demands. Leading the "hard-liners" is Citibank, Brazil's
biggest private bank creditor.
According to Brazilian columunist Joelmir Betting, Citibank's president John Reed has chosen to
offer the Sarney government a "colher de cha" (slang for offering a token, such as in "throwing the
`dog' a bone") in the form of financing concerts in July and August by the New York Philharmonic
Orchestra. The Citibank-financed concerts will take place in Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and
Belo Horizonte. Next, recent comments by Federal Reserve Board chairman Paul Volcker about
the unreliability of the Sarney government are also difficult to understand, in light of previous
statements on the dangers of interest rate inflation to world economic stability and solvency for all
indebted nations.
The hard-line position assumed by bankers and Reagan administration officials with respect to
Brazil's financial troubles can probably be explained as a short-term attempt to make the best out
of a bad situation. It is important, after all, to maintain appearances. Brasilia is effectively being
blackmailed.
The Sarney government must at least appear to capitulate to the bankers as a first step toward
obtaining its demands for new monies and improved payment terms. In reality, the Brazilian
demands are little more than the logical results of a simple evaluation of how to avoid economic and
financial disaster. It should be noted that reprisals against Brazil, whether executed by international
bankers or governments of the world's industrialized capitalist countries, would be extremely
counterproductive.
For Citibank, Brazil has been a virtual money tree. In 1983, for instance, Citibank obtained 25% of
its overall profits from Brazil with an investment of only 6% of its total capital. Reprisals in the form
of confiscating Brazilian assets on the exterior could also be met by retaliatory actions far more
costly to foreign banks and governments. The current real value of the hundreds of transnational
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subsidiaries in Brazil far exceeds the sum of that country's foreign debt. [Parts 1 and 2 of this series
appeared in the 03/17/87 and 03/19/87 issues of the Chronicle, respectively.]

-- End --
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